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Imagine a money manager with a crystal ball that predicts the future.
This crystal ball tells the manager that a currency crisis will erupt in six
months and that it will spread across emerging markets. However, it does
not tell the manager anything else. Can he or she use this information to
help predict whether a speciﬁc country, say Mexico or Indonesia, will fare
badly? If this is possible, he or she can then make the right portfolio deci-
sion regarding that country.
The answer will depend on the manager’s view regarding the manner in
which currency crises spread across emerging markets. One view he or she
might hold is that that crises spread randomly. In this case the prediction
supplied by the crystal ball will help, but not a great deal. A second view
the manager might have is that there is a neighborhood eﬀect. That is to
say, fads develop and crises spread mainly to countries in the same area.
After all, the 1994 Mexican crisis hit Latin American countries hardest,
while the 1997 Thai crisis hit mainly Southeast Asian currencies. In this
case the crystal ball would not be very valuable, unless the manager knows
which neighborhood will be the unlucky one. A third view is that the
spread of these crises is determined to a large degree by fundamentals. In
this case the manager will be able to exploit the crystal ball’s information
(a) if there is a set of fundamentals, and a ﬁltering rule that might allow
him or her to predict which countries would be hardest hit by the crisis
and which would be spared; (b) if it is possible to observe these fundamen-
tals before the onset of the crisis; and (c) if these emerging markets have
47suﬃciently free and developed ﬁnancial markets that permit him to take
the right portfolio positions.
In this paper I argue that in light of the Tequila and Asian crises, the
third view (c) is the correct one. I ﬁnd that these crises neither spread
across emerging markets randomly, nor were simply driven by fads. Rather,
I ﬁnd that the cross-country variation in the severity of crisis can be largely
explained by three fundamentals: the strength of a country’s banking sys-
tem, its real exchange rate appreciation, and the liquidity of its central
bank.
I also ﬁnd that the rule linking fundamentals to the crises’ severity is
the same in both the Tequila and Asian crises. Hence, if one had estimated
such a rule using data from the Tequila crisis, then one could have reason-
ably attempted to predict how the Asian crisis would spread using data
available in late 1996 or early 1997. Thus, the simple knowledge of an up-
coming currency crisis is far from useless, and the crystal ball’s prophecy
is a helpful one.
The idea underlying my analysis is that the eruption of a currency crisis
in an emerging market serves as a coordinating device that informs money
managers that others will attack certain currencies. The currencies that
are attacked are not selected randomly, however. Rather, money managers
concentrate their attacks on countries that are most likely to respond with
a high depreciation. This view is consistent with balance-of-payments cri-
ses models with multiple equilibria, like those of Cole and Kehoe (1996),
Obstfeld (1994), and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a).
There is a growing empirical literature on the determinants of currency
crises. This paper is closely related with a previous paper I wrote with Jeﬀ
Sachs and Andres Velasco, in which we tried to explain the spread of the
Tequila crisis. Other related papers are those of Frankel and Rose (1996),
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1996), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini
(1999), and Radelet and Sachs (1998), to mention just a few.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
In order to determine which countries are more likely to loose reserves
or to depreciate during a crisis, I will consider the thought processes of
risk-neutral money managers and government oﬃcials across emerging
markets. Since the short positions involved in a currency attack entail sig-
niﬁcant interest rate costs, an individual money manager will attack a
country only if (a) the manager expects that other money managers will
also attack that country; and (b) he or she expects that the country in
question will respond with a sizable depreciation.
In order for the ﬁrst condition to be satisﬁed it is necessary that money
managers coordinate with each other in selecting which currencies should
be attacked and the timing of the attack itself. In this respect, the eruption
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signals money managers that others might attack certain currencies in the
near future. Accordingly, the question then becomes, which currencies will
be attacked? Money managers will concentrate their attacks on currencies
that are expected to react with greater depreciation in response to capital
outﬂow.
The expected response of a country depends on the preferences of the
government and on the constraints it faces. A country might respond to
an attack by simply loosing reserves, by increasing its interest rate, or by
depreciating.
The ﬁrst alternative may be the least politically costly. At the same time,
it is available only to governments with plenty of reserves to cover their
liquid liabilities; thus this option is not open to the majority of countries,
as their short-run liabilities far exceed their reserves. In these cases, gov-
ernments are faced with a diﬃcult choice between two unpleasant alterna-
tives. Increasing the interest rate makes speculation against the currency
more expensive, and it can help close the external gap by reducing absorp-
tion; yet, the eﬀects come at the cost of a recession. In emerging markets,
the health of the banking system is a very important determinant of the
eﬀect that increasing interest rates have on the economy. When the bank-
ing system has a big share of bad loans, a given interest rate increase is
more likely to induce a greater recession or even a meltdown of the pay-
ments system. Thus, money managers know that the weaker the banking
system, the less likely the government to respond to an attack with an
interest rate hike.
If a government chooses the third alternative, depreciation, what is the
extent of the depreciation the government must engineer in order to close
a given external gap? The greater the real appreciation has been during
the previous few years, the more likely it is that ﬁrms in the tradable sector
have shifted to the nontradable sector, and the greater the nominal depre-
ciation necessary to close the external gap.
Summing up, when a currency crisis erupts in an emerging market,
money managers will expect others to attack those countries that are more
likely to respond to an attack with a big depreciation. Thus, the crisis is not
likely to spread to countries with high reserves. Among the low reserves
countries, the crisis is more likely to reach those where interest rate in-
creases arelikely to generate bigrecessions (e.g., countries withweak bank-
ing systems), and will also aﬀect countries that have experienced a high
real appreciation.
2.3 Empirics
There are several ways to measure the three fundamentals discussed in
the previous section and the severity of a crisis. In this paper, I have chosen
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and Reinhart (1996), and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b).
to proxy the three fundamentals with variables that are available in data
sources, such as the International Financial Statistics (IFS), where one
might be conﬁdent that the same deﬁnitions have been applied to all coun-
tries. Note that the variables must be available on a timely basis if this
exercise is to have some connection with the decision rules used by money
managers. In the end, one would like the derived rule to apply to future
currency crises in emerging markets. Therefore, the formulas used to con-
struct the indexes will be as simple as possible. By interacting several vari-
ables in a nonlinear way, one could produce indexes that eliminate “nasty”
observations and insure a fairly good explanation of a speciﬁc crisis. The
drawback to this approach is that the rule so derived might not explain
other crises.
I measure the severity of the crisis in the standard way it is done in the
literature.1 Thus, my crisis index is a weighted average of the loss in re-
serves and the depreciation against the U.S. dollar. Each of the two compo-
nents is weighted by its precision over the sum of both precisions, calcu-
lated from a monthly series of ten years.
Ideally, one should measure the weakness of the banking system with
the “true” share of bad loans. Unfortunately, this information is available
neither on a timely basis nor in data sources that insure cross-country
comparability. For instance, suppose that country A has a smaller true
bad-to-total loans ratio than country B, but that A has adopted U.S. gener-
ally accepted accounting procedure (GAAP) rules, while country B has
not. In this case, it is very likely that B might report a smaller bad-loans
ratio because it classiﬁes only the debt service that is delinquent as a bad
loan. In contrast, country A will consider the entire stock of the delinquent
debt as a bad loan. A second problem that arises is misreporting, or the
so-called “evergreen accounts problem.” Banks (and often regulators) have
many incentives to disguise the fact that there are nonperforming loans.
Hence, banks will simply continue to lend to the nonperforming accounts
an amount equivalent to the payments the accounts were supposed to
make. This cultivation of evergreen accounts can go on for a long period
of time without market participants’ noticing the problem. This brings us
to the third problem, namely that information on nonperforming loans is
not available on a timely basis. For instance, money managers looking at
the Mexican bad loans ratio in 1994 saw very decent numbers; the recog-
nition of a sizable share of bad loans did not come until after the crisis
had erupted.
For these reasons, I proxy the weakness of the banking system with a
lending boom index. This variable is available on a timely basis and is
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my own proxy, since I am unsure how that index is constructed.
comparable across countries. I measure the lending boom as the real per-
cent increase in loans provided by the banking system to the private sector
and state-owned enterprises over the previous four years. One should ex-
pect that the greater the increase of loans provided by the banking system
during a short span of time, the greater the share of bad loans in the
subsequent period. There are several reasons this is true. First, banks have
limited capacity to evaluate projects. Second, regulatory agencies have lim-
ited monitoring capacity and resources. Last, there exists only a limited
supply of “good” projects with high expected returns relative to their vari-
ance.
I then replace the real exchange rate with a weighted average of the bi-
lateral real exchange rates of a given country with respect to the U.S. dol-
lar, the Mark, and the yen. The weights add up to 1 and are proportional
to the shares of bilateral trade in the given country with the United States,
the European Union, and Japan, respectively. My real depreciation index
is the percentage change in this index over the four years prior to the onset
of the crisis, i.e., December 1994 relative to December 1990, and Decem-
ber 1996 relative to December 1992.2 The problems associated with mea-
suring real depreciation in this way are well understood, so I will not dis-
cuss them here.
I proxy the government’s liquidity by the ratio of M2 to reserves in the
month preceding the onset of the crisis (November 1994 or May 1997). If
the central bank is not willing to let the exchange rate depreciate, it must
be prepared to cover all the liabilities of the banking system with reserves.
Thus it is M2, and not simply the monetary base, that must be the relevant
proxy of the central bank’s contingent liabilities. During a crisis, banks are
likely to experience runs. If the central bank does not act as a lender of
last resort, generalized bankruptcies are likely to follow. Since, in most
circumstances, authorities will not ﬁnd it optimal to allow the economy
to experience generalized bankruptcies, the central bank will have to be
prepared to exchange the amount withdrawn by depositors for foreign ex-
change.
My sample consists of all the developing countries (for which data are
available) that have had free convertibility, and ﬁnancial markets in which
foreigners could freely invest during the 1990s. I consider all countries
considered as emerging markets by the International Finance Corporation,
with the exception of (a) Greece and Portugal, as they belong to the Euro-
pean Union and are not developing countries; (b) China, because there is
no free convertibility; and (c) Nigeria, because there is no data availability.
Thus, my sample consists of Hong Kong and twenty-two other countries:
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Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
I discuss the two generalized emerging-market currency crises that have
occurred in the 1990s. Previous crises, like the debt crisis of the early 1980s,
were of a diﬀerent nature and are not considered. In those cases, ﬁnancial
markets in emerging markets were not yet liberalized, and the majority of
capital inﬂows took the form of loans to governments by big foreign banks
or oﬃcial agencies. The currency crises of the 1990s have happened under
diﬀerent conditions, and thus one should expect diﬀerent mechanisms at
work.
2.3.1 The Benchmark Regression
As mentioned earlier, I am not trying to determine the timing of a crisis,
but rather the manner in which a crisis will spread across emerging mar-
kets, given the eruption of a crisis somewhere. As discussed in the previous
section, the onset of a crisis in one country serves as a coordinating device
for investors. At this point, each money manager knows that others will
do the same and will reshuﬄe his or her portfolio accordingly. If a country
has strong fundamentals or high reserves, it is not likely to depreciate sig-
niﬁcantly in response to an attack. Hence, investors will not ﬁnd it proﬁt-
able to attack such a country—they will have to incur the interest costs
associated with the attack while the expected capital gains are small. Be-
cause of this, one should not expect that variations in the explanatory vari-
ables should signiﬁcantly aﬀect the crisis indexes in this subset of coun-
tries. Thus, investors will concentrate their attacks on countries with weak
fundamentals and low reserves. Furthermore, within this subset of coun-
tries they will allocate more resources to attack countries that are more
likely to respond with greater depreciations. Such countries have had a
greater lending boom or a greater real appreciation, or both. Countries
from the ﬁrst group have weaker banking systems that induce authorities
to resist raising interest rates because of the greater risk of a deep recession
or generalized bankruptcies. Countries belonging to the second group will
have to engineer a greater nominal depreciation in order to close a given
current account deﬁcit.
I implement these ideas empirically by classifying observations into four
groups: high- and low-reserves cases, and strong and weak fundamentals
cases. In my benchmark regression, I classify most country-years as being
the ones with low reserves and weak fundamentals. Then, I consider more
and less stringent deﬁnitions of the vulnerable region, and see how re-
sults change.
In the benchmark case, a country-year has high reserves (Dhr  1) if its
M2/reserves ratio is below 1.8. A country-year has strong fundamentals
(Dsf  1) if its lending boom (LB) is below 0 percent and its real exchange
52 Aaron Tornell3. Below I test whether there are ﬁxed or random eﬀects.
rate appreciation is lower than 5 percent. The group with high reserves
includes seven country-years while the group with strong fundamentals
includes ﬁve country-years.
In the benchmark I stack the observations for the 1994 and 1997 crises,
and estimate the following regression using ordinary least squares:3
(1) Crisis LB RER D LB
D RER D LB D RER
hr
hr sf sf
it i it it it
it it it it
=+ ∗ +∗ +∗ ∗ +
∗∗ + ∗∗ + ∗∗ +




where i indexes the country and t indexes time. Lending boom is repre-
sented by LB, and real exchange rate depreciation by RER.
The eﬀects of the lending boom and real depreciation in the case of
weak fundamentals and low reserves are captured by 1 and 2,r e s p e c -
tively. Theory predicts that when there is fragility, the crisis will be greater
if the lending boom is large (i.e., 1 	 0) and the real depreciation is low
(i.e., 2 
 0). The eﬀects of the lending boom and real depreciation for the
case of high reserves are captured by 1  3 and 2  4, respectively.
Meanwhile, in the case of strong fundamentals, these eﬀects are captured
by 1  5 and 2  6, respectively. According to the theory, if there is
no fragility (Dhr  1o rD sf  1), neither a greater lending boom nor a
greater appreciation will aﬀect the investors’ decision to attack. Thus one
expects to ﬁnd that 1  3  2  4  0, and 1  5  2  6  0.
For the benchmark, I consider the crisis index that corresponds to the
ﬁve months after the onset of the crisis. In the Mexican crisis, I look at
November 1994–April 1995; for the Asian case, I consider May 1997–
October 1997. The estimated regression is shown in table 2.1, which shows
how the estimates change as the crisis index varies.
The estimates in table 2.1 accord with the theory espoused earlier. First,
for countries with weak fundamentals and low reserves, the coeﬃcients
corresponding to the lending boom (1) and the real depreciation (2)a r e
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent level. The point estimates
indicate that (a) a unit increase in the LB index for a country with low
reserves and weak fundamentals leads to a 0.24 unit increase in the crisis
index of that country relative to the average of our emerging markets
sample; and (b) a unit increase in the real appreciation index leads to a
0.12 increase in the crisis index relative to the average. Second, as ex-
pected, neither the LB index nor the RER enter signiﬁcantly in countries
with high reserves. In these cases, the corresponding point estimates are
1  3  0.01 and 2  4  0.03. Furthermore, Wald tests indicate
that the hypotheses 1  3  0a n d2  4  0 cannot be rejected (the
associated p-values are 0.74 and 0.91, respectively). Similarly, in countries
with strong fundamentals, neither LB nor RER aﬀect the severity of the
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5  0a n d2  6  0 are 0.51 and 0.74, respectively.
In summary, the regression results support the idea that currency crises
do not spread randomly. One can predict—with fair conﬁdence—that a
crisis will spread to countries that are vulnerable. A country is vulnerable
to an attack if it has had an appreciated real exchange rate for the past
few years or if it has experienced a lending boom, increasing the likelihood
that its banking system is laden with bad loans. Both eﬀects point in the
direction of a higher expected depreciation, unless the country in question
has suﬃcient international reserves relative to its short-term liabilities. In
this case, the best response of the government might be to defend the peg.
A few examples illustrate how the combination of these three fundamen-
tals can help one rationalize some puzzling cases. If one looks at Peru, for
instance, one sees that over the four years prior to the Tequila crisis Peru
had experienced a similar appreciation and a greater lending boom than
Mexico. However, Peru’s crisis index was only 2.7, while Mexico’s was
79.3. This can be explained by the fact that Mexico was illiquid (recall the
Tesobonos story), while Peru was not. In fact, in November 1994, the ratio
of M2 to reserves was 1.25 for Peru and 9.25 in Mexico.
The results presented here for the two crises are very similar to those
obtained by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b; henceforth STV) for the
Tequila crisis. In order to compare results, one should take note of the
Table 2.1 Benchmark Regression
Estimated
Coeﬃcient and Independent Simple


















Note: The dependent variable is the Crisis Index; Newey-West heteroscedasticity–adjusted
standard errors in parentheses.
54 Aaron Tornellfollowing slight diﬀerences between the papers. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that
STV multiply the estimated coeﬃcients by ten. Also, STV use a weak fun-
damentals dummy instead of the strong fundamentals dummy used here.
My coeﬃcients 1 and 2 correspond to the STV coeﬃcients 3  5  7
and 2  4  6, respectively. Last, due to data availability, the STV
sample contains fewer countries than the sample examined here.
2.3.2 Structural Change
At this point in the analysis, a natural question arises as to whether the
same model that explains the spread of the crisis in 1995 also explains the
cross-country variation in the 1997 crisis, or whether there was, in fact, a
structural change. The ﬁrst column of table 2.2 shows the estimates of the
benchmark regression that includes the Tequila and Asian crisis. The sec-
ond and third columns show the estimates of regression equation (1) for
the 1994 and 1997 crises, respectively. The point estimates for the coeﬃ-
cient corresponding to the lending boom (1) are very similar (0.24, 0.25,
and 0.22, respectively). Those corresponding to the real exchange rate de-
preciation (2)a r e0.12, 0.16, and 0.07, respectively.
To test the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients in equation (1) are the same













Since the critical value at the 1 percent level is 3.3, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that the sets of coeﬃcients are the same in the two periods.
Next, I check whether the two coeﬃcients that interest me most (1 and
2) are the same in both periods. To do this, I ﬁrst add the term 8 ∗ LB ∗
D97 to equation (1), where D97 takes the value of 1 for observations that
correspond to the 1997 crisis. It follows that in countries with weak funda-
mentals and low reserves, the eﬀect of the lending boom on the crisis index
is 1 for the 1994 crisis and 1  8 for the 1997 crisis. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is 8  0. As can be seen in column 4 in table 2.2, the estimate
of 8 is not diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. Next, I
perform the same test for the real exchange rate depreciation. Column 5
in table 2.2 shows the estimation results for equation (1), adding the extra
term 9 ∗ RER ∗ D97. Again, the estimate for 9 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from zero at the 10 percent level.
2.3.3 Predicting the Asian Crisis
Suppose that the crystal ball predicted that a crisis would erupt in mid-
1997, and suppose the money manager had estimated the model of equa-
tion (1) using data from the 1994 crisis. How well will he or she predict














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the spread of the crisis across emerging markets? Note that the question is
not “When will the next crisis erupt?” Rather, the objective here is simply
to make an out-of-sample prediction conditional on the occurrence of a
crisis.
Toward this end, I will construct an out-of-sample predicted crisis index
by substituting in equation (1) the following: (a) the estimated coeﬃcients
of a regression that uses only data from the 1994 crisis; and (b) the explan-
atory variables that correspond to the 1997 crisis, i.e., the lending boom
and the real depreciation over the period 1992–96 and the M2/reserves of
May 1997. The resulting predicted crisis indexes are depicted as the dashed
line in ﬁgure 2.1. The solid line represents the actual crisis indexes, while
the dotted lines represent the ﬁtted values of the regression using only the
data from 1997. As can be seen in ﬁgure 2.1, the predicted crisis indexes
using 1994 data are quite similar to the ﬁtted crisis indexes using 1997
data.
To measure how well the out-of-sample prediction ﬁts the actual crisis
indexes of 1997, I regressed the actual crisis indexes of 1997 on the pre-
dicted crisis indexes











The correlation between the two series is 0.88, and it is signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from zero at the 1 percent level. Thus one can see that, by using the
1994 model, a manager would not have fared badly in predicting which
countries would have been hard hit in 1997.
2.3.4 The Crisis Index
In order to analyze whether the results are robust to changes in the
period over which the crisis index is measured, I estimate the regression
equation using six crises indexes. For all indexes, the starting point is the
month preceding the onset of the crisis (i.e., November 1994 for the Te-
quila crisis and May 1997 for the Asian crisis). Then, we vary the terminal
month over a period of six months starting in January 1995 or July 1997.
As table 2.3 shows, in columns (4)–(6) the point estimates and signiﬁcance
levels are similar to those of the benchmark regression (column [3]). More-
over, the estimate of 1 (which corresponds to the lending boom) is signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent level in all columns, and the
point estimates in columns (4)–(6) are very similar to the benchmark esti-
mate of 0.26.
2.3.5 Alternative Deﬁnitions of the Dummies
In the benchmark regression, a country year is classiﬁed as having high
reserves if, at the onset of the crisis, its ratio of M2 to reserves is lower





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.than 1.8. According to this criterion, seven cases had high reserves. Under
the benchmark, a country has strong fundamentals if its lending boom
variable is negative and its real appreciation is less than 5 percent (this
yields four country years). The second and third columns of table 2.4 show
the estimates for diﬀerent thresholds concerning the high reserves dummy,
while keeping the strong fundamentals dummy unchanged. In the second
column, the threshold is 1.5 three country years), and, in the third column,
2.0 (ten country years). Column (4) corresponds to the case in which fun-
damentals are strong if the lending boom is less than 20 percent and the
real appreciation is less than 5 percent (nine country years), while in col-
umn (5) these thresholds are both zero (two cases).
For countries with low reserves and weak fundamentals, the point esti-
mates corresponding to the lending boom (1) and the real depreciation
(2) are very similar to the benchmark estimates in all cases. Furthermore,
they are all signiﬁcant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The estimates for the remaining parameters are stable. Lastly, the p-values
associated with the Wald tests are greater than 0.10, except in three cases.
Since the thresholds we have considered vary over wide ranges, we might
conclude that the benchmark results are robust to the way in which I deﬁne
strong fundamentals and high reserves.
2.3.6 Outliers
To see if the benchmark results are driven by a single outlier, I estimate
equation (1) by eliminating, one at the time, the country-years whose resid-
uals are greater than two standard deviations away from the mean. As can
be seen in table 2.5, in all cases, the point estimates of 1 are positive and
those of 2 are negative. Furthermore, both are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
2.3.7 Additional Determinants of Currency Crises
High government consumption, excessive capital inﬂows, and unsus-
tainable current account deﬁcits have been identiﬁed as important deter-
minants of currency crises in some well-known episodes. Here, I analyze
whether these variables help explain the cross-country variation in the cri-
sis indexes after controlling for the lending boom, the real appreciation,
and the reserves adequacy ratio. I measure each concept as the average
ratio to GDP over the four years prior to the onset of the crisis (either
1990–94 or 1992–96). In each case I interact the extra variable with the
high-reserves dummy and the strong-fundamentals dummy. The estimated
coeﬃcients are presented in table 2.6.
My regression estimates indicate that in countries with low reserves and
weak fundamentals, government consumption has a positive eﬀe c to nt h e








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.excluded. As column 1 in table 2.6 shows, the estimated coeﬃc i e n to ng o v -
ernment consumption is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent
level. However, if the lending boom and real depreciation variables are in-
cluded, government consumption ceases to be signiﬁcant (column 2). One
can interpret this ﬁnding as saying that if excessive government consump-
tion leads to a greater crisis, it does so, not directly, but rather through
its eﬀects on the lending boom and the real exchange rate. It is interest-
ing to note that the point estimates and signiﬁcance levels of the remain-
ing parameters in column 2 are very similar to the ones in benchmark
equation (1).
Now I turn the discussion to capital inﬂows. A popular view is that
excessive capital inﬂows must lead eventually to a currency crisis. The
reason for that is because in a short span of time, excessive inﬂows cannot
be eﬃciently channeled to productive projects. Thus, they end up invested
in “white-elephant” or “crony” projects. As a result, the economy is not
able to generate, over the medium run, the necessary returns to repay in-
vestors. It is at this point that the economy becomes vulnerable to a crisis.
Column 3 of table 2.6 presents the estimates of a regression equation that
includes only the capital inﬂows variable. For countries with low reserves
and weak fundamentals, capital inﬂows enter positively and signiﬁcantly
at the 10 percent level. However, if one includes the lending boom and the
real depreciation indexes, capital inﬂows have no eﬀect on the severity of
the crisis (column 4). As before, this ﬁnding suggests that capital inﬂows
do not have an extra eﬀe c to nt h ee x t e n to fac r i s i sb e y o n dt h ee ﬀect they
exert on the lending boom and real appreciation.
Last, I consider the ratio of the average current account deﬁcit to gross
domestic product (GDP). It is frequently argued that countries cannot run
large current account deﬁcits for long periods of time; this view is related
to the Feldstein-Horioka ﬁnding. Here, I consider the average current ac-
count over the four years preceding each crisis. Since four years is hardly
the long run, one should not expect to see a positive relation between
the current account variable and the crises indexes. Surprisingly, the point
estimates of the current account variable are negative. As before, the esti-
mates are signiﬁcant only when I exclude the lending boom and real depre-
ciation indexes from the regression (see columns 5 and 6).
2.4 Conclusions
These ﬁndings suggest that in the recent Tequila and Asian episodes,
currency crises did not spread in a purely random way. Rather, a set of
fundamentals helps explain the cross-country variation of the severity of
those crises. I ﬁnd that crises did not spread to countries with strong fun-
damentals or high international reserves; furthermore, within the set of
vulnerable countries (those with weak fundamentals and low reserves), I
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and the severity of the real appreciation experienced by the country.
I also ﬁnd it untrue that Latin American countries were hardest hit by
the crisis in 1995 simply because they were located in Latin America, and
that in 1997 Asian countries were the hardest hit simply because they were
located in Asia. I ﬁnd that the same model that explains the spread of the
crisis in 1995 also explains the cross-country variation in the 1997 crisis.
This ﬁnding helps explain why in 1995 the hardest hit countries were Latin
American, while in 1997 the Southeast Asian countries were the hardest
hit. Prior to the Tequila crisis, Latin American countries, on average, had
experienced bigger lending booms and more severe real appreciations than
Southeast Asian countries; interestingly, the opposite is true for the period
preceding the Asian crisis.
There is an ongoing debate regarding the causes of currency crises.
Some researchers argue that crises are caused mainly by fundamentals,
while other researchers claim that crises are simply the result of speculative
behavior in a world with multiple equilibria. Our ﬁndings indicate that
both views are in some sense correct. The fundamentalist view is correct
in the sense that if fundamentals are strong, it is very unlikely that a coun-
try will be attacked. The sunspots view is correct in the sense that if funda-
mentals are weak, the country enters into a region of multiple equilibria
and becomes vulnerable to an attack. Note, however, that the fact that a
country is vulnerable does not imply that it must suﬀer a crisis in the near
future. It implies only that if investors’ expectations turn pessimistic, a
crisis will ensue because the government will be forced to close the external
gap through a large depreciation, justifying investors’ expectations. To the
extent that investors’ expectations are unpredictable, the crisis in a particu-
lar country is unpredictable.
Appendix
Real Exchange Rate Depreciation
I use the percentage change in the weighted average of the bilateral real
exchange rates (using consumer price indexes [CPIs]) with respect to the
yen, the U.S. dollar, and the Deutsche mark as a proxy for real exchange
depreciation. The weights sum to 1 and are proportional to the bilateral
trade shares with Japan, the United States, and the European Union. The
extent of depreciation is measured as the percentage increase in the real
exchange rate index from 1990 to 1994 for the earlier crisis period and
from 1992 to 1996 for the later crisis period. I compute trade shares from
the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
Lending Booms and Currency Crises 651997, for the years 1992 and 1995, and use average nominal exchange rates
(line rf from the IFS CD-ROM) and CPIs (line 64). Using 1992 weights,
J. P. Morgan data are used for Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Lending Boom
I use the percentage change in total domestic credit (line 32 from the
IFS CD-ROM) minus government claims (line 32an) adjusted for inﬂation
using the December CPIs (line 64). The lending boom is the percentage
change from 1990 to 1994 for the earlier crisis and from 1992 to 1996 for
the later crisis.
Reserve Adequacy
I use the ratio of M2 to total reserves minus gold (line 1Ld) as a proxy
for reserve adequacy; the ratio is calculated as of November 1994 and for
June 1997. M2 is calculated using the sum of money (line 34) and quasi-
money (line 35). Reserves are converted to national currency using the
monthly exchange rate (line rf). Several countries did not have data up-
dated through June 1997, so the most recent measure was used. For Ma-
laysia, Poland, Taiwan, and Hungary the relevant measures are as of
November 1996, November 1996, December 1996, and March 1997, re-
spectively. The ratios for these countries are fairly stable over time.
Crisis Index
The crisis index is the depreciation of the exchange rate plus the negative
of the percentage change in reserves between November 1994 and a given
month in 1995 or May 1997 and various later months. Each of the two
components is weighted by its precision over the sum of precision calcu-
l a t e df r o mam o n t h l ys e r i e so ft e ny e a r s .F o rs e v e r a lc o u n t r i e s ,r e s e r v e
data were not available monthly for the entire ten-year period and were
calculated from the data available in the IFS. Precision for Hong Kong is
calculated from mixed frequency data (quarterly for several years and then
monthly). Precision for Hungary begins September 1989. Taiwan is mea-
sured from 1994 through 1997. For Poland, precision calculation begins in
1990 when the currency stabilized after the transition to a free market
economy. IFS was missing reserve information for many countries for re-
cent data; reserves were ﬁlled in using a variety of sources, including The
Economist, Bloomberg, and the central banks of various countries. In ad-
dition, Datastream was used to extend exchange rates. All of these data
sources were checked with the previous ﬁgures from the IFS.
Current Account
I converted (line 78a1) to national currency using annual exchange rates
(line rf). This enters into the regression as an average over 1990–94, as a
share of GDP over 1992–96, and the percentage change (in U.S. dollars).
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The sum of capital account (line 78bc), ﬁnancial account (line 78bj) and
net errors and omissions (line 78ca) was converted to national currency
using annual exchange rates (line rf). This enters into the regression as
average over 1990–94, as share of GDP over 1992–96, and as percent
change (in U.S. dollars). Data are missing for Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Government Consumption
This information is taken from line 91f. It enters into the regression as
average over 1990–94, as share of GDP over 1992–96, as percent change
as share of GDP, and as percent change adjusted for inﬂation using annual
CPIs. Data are missing for Argentina.
Taiwan
Montly reserves and exchange rates were taken from Bulletin of Statis-
tics of the Republic of China and supplemented by Datastream and Asian
Development Bank (for more recent data).
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In this paper, Aaron Tornell uses the data from the Tequila and Asian
crises to show that the severity of a crisis (deﬁned as a weighted average
of the decline in reserves and the extent of currency depreciation) can be
explained by three variables: the weakness of the banking system (mea-
sured by a lending boom index deﬁned as a real percentage increase in
bank loans), real appreciation (measured in eﬀective terms against the
U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Deutsche mark), and central bank
liquidity (measured as the ratio of M2 to reserves).
This paper makes an important contribution in showing that fundamen-
tals (as opposed to simple fad or a change in expectations) play a role in
explaining the spread of a crisis. The strength of Tornell’s approach is that
it is simple (consisting of only three explanatory variables) and based only
on publicly available, timely information. Simplicity gives power to the
prediction model as a policy tool because it allows policy makers to con-
centrate on a few important fundamental determinants. The use of public
and timely information is reasonable because there is no other way that
market participants can form expectations that may trigger a crisis.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the nature of the exercise
is conditional, in the sense that prediction is contingent on the occurrence
of a crisis. Hence, it does not say anything about whether a certain range
of fundamental values will trigger a crisis. In this sense, it is consistent
with the so-called second-generation model of currency crises in which
there are multiple equilibria. It is not clear, however, to what extent it suc-
ceeds in discriminating between ﬁrst-generation and second-generation
models.
There are at least four potential areas of concern. First, the benchmarks
of low/high reserves and strong/weak fundamentals seem arbitrary. To the
extent that we are interested more in knowing whether a crisis will occur
(or spread) than in knowing how severe the crisis will be when one occurs
(and spreads), it may be useful to endogenize these benchmarks. Second,
in practice, the same benchmarks may have diﬀerent implications, de-
pending on how the particular outcome is brought about. For example, an
increase in reserves may be “bad” if it is caused by an oﬃcial foreign-
exchange market intervention designed to maintain an inappropriate peg.
Likewise, real appreciation can be “good” if it reﬂects the nominal ap-
preciation of the currency in response to capital inﬂows. Prediction (or ﬁt)
may improve if good and bad types of reserve increase or real appreciation
is separated out in the data.
Third, control needs to be made for policy responses (e.g., bailout by
Shinji Takagi is visiting professor of economics at Yale University, on leave from his posi-
tion as professor of economics at Osaka University.
68 Aaron Tornellthe IMF or capital controls). In other words, the severity of a crisis cannot
entirely be captured by the author’s variable if the outcome shows up in
ways other than declining reserves or depreciation. Finally, there can be a
fourth variable, reﬂecting the real and ﬁnancial links across countries,
which will likely manifest itself as regional links. For example, prediction
of a crisis for Latin American and Asian countries may be improved, if it
is made conditional on the occurrence of a crisis in Mexico (for 1994–95)
and in Thailand (for 1997), respectively. These and other reﬁnements may
enhance the usefulness of Tornell’s approach to understanding how a crisis
may spread across countries.
Comment Chi-Wa Yuen
Objectives of the Paper
This paper addresses two major issues about the currency crises in 1995
and 1997:
1. What are the “fundamental” determinants of these two crises?
2. Could the Asian crisis have been predicted given the lessons learned
from the Tequila crisis and knowledge about the fundamentals above?
Main Findings
Regarding the ﬁrst issue, the author has constructed a “crisis index” as
a weighted average of the loss in reserves and the depreciation against the
U.S. dollar, and found that its severity in both the Tequila and Asian crises
is determined by three common factors.
1a. Centralbankliquidityorforeign-exchangereserveadequacyasprox-
ied by the M2/reserve ratio; the higher the ratio, the more severe the crisis.
1b. Strength of the banking system as proxied by the “lending boom”
(LB) index (deﬁned as inﬂation-adjusted percentage change in total do-
mestic credit less government claims); the higher the LB index, the more
severe the crisis.
1c. Extent of real exchange rate (RER) appreciation (where RER is
deﬁned as a trade-weighted average of bilateral RER’s against the U.S.
dollar, the Deutsche mark, and the Japanese yen); the higher the RER (the
smaller the appreciation), the less severe the crisis.
Chi-Wa Yuen is associate professor of economics and ﬁnance at the University of Hong
Kong.
Lending Booms and Currency Crises 69Related to issue number 1 at the beginning of this comment, the author
also ﬁnds that three other factors usually believed to be important deter-
minants of currency crises—namely, ratios of government consumption,
capital inﬂows, and current account deﬁcits to gross domestic product
(GDP)—have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the crisis index only if the eﬀects from
the three common factors (1a, 1b, and 1c) mentioned above are excluded.1
He then claims that these three alternative factors have only indirect eﬀects
on currency crises through their eﬀects on the lending boom and real ap-
preciation.
Regarding issue number 2, the author ﬁnds that the “ﬁtted” crisis in-
dexes based on the Asian crisis data are very close to the “predicted” crisis
indexes based on parameter estimates from the Tequila crisis data and
actual values of the three “fundamental” determinants (1a, 1b, and 1c)
from the Asian crisis. In other words, he obtains good out-of-sample fore-
casts,2 implying that the Asian crisis could have been predicted given the
lessons learned from the Tequila crisis in 1994 and knowledge about the
fundamentals in 1997.
Analysis
Let me classify my discussion into three categories: the conceptual
framework and deﬁnition of variables, “fundamentals” vs. “self-fulﬁlling
expectations” as crisis determinants, and the predictability of the Asian
crisis.
Conceptual Framework and Deﬁnition of Variables
In analyzing which country will be most prone to currency attacks, the
author proposes a conceptual framework that suggests that risk-neutral
speculators will pick countries with low reserves and high costs of interest
rate adjustment and, among these countries, speciﬁcally those which are
e x p e c t e dt os u ﬀer sizable depreciation when attacked. To most readers,
this framework may sound very intuitive and clear. My personal experi-
ence with the Hong Kong dollar indicates that countries with high reserves
and strong banking systems may nonetheless be subject to speculative at-
tacks even when the speculators do not expect their actions to induce a
sizable depreciation. Under the currency board system, any attack on the
Hong Kong dollar will drive up the interest rate through an automatic
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1. In examining capital inﬂows as an additional determinant of crisis, one should take into
account the composition of these capital ﬂows. In particular, portfolio debt ﬂows can serve
as a partial substitute for bank lending. As a result, with both capital inﬂows and the lending
boom as right-hand side variables in the regression equation, there may exist a collinearity
problem.
2. Instead of regressing the “97 crisis” on the “out-of-sample predicted 97 crisis” to show
that these forecasts are good, the author could have simply reported the mean squared errors
from the prediction exercise.adjustment mechanism. Given the negative correlation between the inter-
est rate and stock prices, this will lead to a drop in the prices of Hong
Kong stocks. Anticipating these dynamics, speculators can engineer a
“double-market play” to make proﬁts by attacking the Hong Kong dollar
in the foreign exchange market and short-selling Hong Kong stocks in the
market for stock futures—without actually causing any collapse or depre-
ciation in the Hong Kong dollar. In other words, expectation of a sizable
depreciation is not a necessary condition for a currency attack. What is
necessary instead is the existence of some sort of expected proﬁts resulting
from the attack.
In his conceptual framework, the author lists three possible responses
of a country to a currency attack: (a) loss of reserves, (b) depreciation, and
(c) rise in interest rate. It is not clear why, in constructing his crisis index,
he considers only (a) and (b) and leaves out (c). In addition, there is some
inconsistency between the deﬁnition of depreciation in his crisis index and
that in his RER (the real exchange rate) index. In his crisis index, “depre-
ciation” means depreciation of a country’s currency against the U.S. dol-
lar only; whereas in his RER index, it includes depreciation against the
Deutsche mark and the Japanese yen in addition to depreciation against
the U.S. dollar.
Another important variable in this paper is the weakness of the banking
system as proxied by the “lending boom.” While it is evident why excessive
bank lending may give rise to a crisis, this may not be the case if the total
asset value of the banking system as a whole is also growing. I thus think
that the lending boom should be redeﬁned to adjust for the values of the
banks’ loanable assets.
“Fundamentals” vs. “Self-Fulﬁlling Expectations” as
Determinants of the Tequila and Asian Crises
In the speculative attacks literature, there has been a debate on whether
fundamentals or self-fulﬁlling expectations are a more important driving
force for currency crises. According to the benchmark regression analysis
in section 2.3.1 of the paper, both the Tequila and Asian crises were driven
by a common set of fundamentals. This may seem to suggest that the ﬁrst-
generation model of currency crisis (based on fundamentals) better ﬁts the
Tequila and Asian stories. A little reﬂection indicates, however, that the
second-generation model (based on self-fulﬁlling expectations) may ﬁt the
stories just as well. This is because the latter has never denied the role
of fundamentals in speculative attacks. Instead, it maintains that, in the
presence of multiple equilibria, whether self-fulﬁlling currency attacks will
actually occur depends on the range of critical values that the fundamen-
tals fall into.
In fact, the author has gone halfway to addressing this issue by introduc-
ing two dummy variables—reserve adequacy (Dhr and “fundamentals”
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appreciation—in the interaction terms in his benchmark regression.3 Some
sensitivity analysis is also carried out in table 2.4 by varying the bench-
mark values of these dummies. Nonetheless, it still cannot resolve the
puzzle as to how important fundamentals are relative to self-fulﬁlling ex-
pectations in driving these two crises.
Predictability of the Asian Crisis
Turning to the issue of predictability of the Asian crisis based on the
Tequila crisis, I am not sure how useful this exercise really is. This is be-
cause the ﬁnding that the out-of-sample forecasts are reasonably good is
conditional on the absence of structural changes from one crisis to the
next (which the author has shown by running a Chow test) and is thus
known after the fact. However, what is necessary for prediction analysis of
the kind examined in this paper (i.e., using reduced-form regression esti-
mates from an earlier crisis to predict the likelihood or severity of a later
crisis) is knowledge about the absence of structural changes before the fact.
Using the same prediction method, can we be sure that we can get accurate
forecasts about the crisis index in, say, the year 1999 or 2000 based on the
regression estimates from the Tequila and Asian crises? The answer is “no”
because there is no way we can know for sure that there will not be any
structural change in the year 1999 or 2000. The issue I am raising here is
actually well known and general—i.e., the curse of reduced-form regres-
sions and the need to go for structural estimation for prediction purposes
when one is uncertain about the possibility of structural change.
In conclusion, the paper has uncovered a common set of fundamentals
that drives the Tequila and Asian crises. It remains unclear, however,
whether the same will apply to future crises.
3. It is not clear why reserve adequacy is treated separately from lending boom and RER
appreciation and not counted as fundamentals as well.
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